What is the Quadratwurzelverfahren?
Many journalists don’t seem to have a clue when reporting about the EU-Summit and the dispute about voting weights in the new EU-Constitution/EU-Treaty. They are a little bit like the statue of the nightwalker in front of the Commission – stepping blindly of their post.
Firstly, Poland has no veto power. According to Article 48 of the European Treaty, the Summit of the EU-Head of States, can with a two-third majority of their current weight invite a new government conference to negotiate a new treaty. Sure, in reality, they will aim for consensus, but if Poland or any other country does not agree, the door for a new treaty is open.
Secondly, voting weight does not equal voting power. If there are three countries with two having a voting weight of 49 votes and one having two votes, and the quorum (or the minimum amount of votes needed to have a decision) is 51 votes, then all three have an equal voting power. You can verify this easily by looking at all possible combinations of votes (8=2^3) and then see in which cases one of the players can change an outcome by changing his votes.
Thirdly, it is the quorum, not the voting power that is more important to determine whether small or large countries are strengthened. The higher the quorum, the more power goes to small players because they can be the little feather that tilts the scales. But this is not always the case for all players – in fact both the quorum and the voting weights are necessary to determine the voting power.
Fourthly, the Quadratwurzelverfahren (square root method) is really the most transparent and best ways to assign voting weights. It is based on the assumption that each voter should have an equal chance in determining European decisions. So not just each member-state, but each person in Germany, Latvia, Spain or Malta. It is a transparent and easy way of determining voting weights. So Poland is at least justified to demand this method.
Fifthly, voting mechanisms are not equal to decision-making mechanism. In any kind of negotiation, informal mechanism and cooperation have a much bigger influence than voting weights. Even if Poland receives more votes due to their heavy insistence, they might receive less informal power to influence EU-politics – something that the Austrians and their FPÖ-coalition had experienced a long time ago. In the Council of Ministers, quite a lot of decisions are made consensually, but in the preparation to the Final Drafts, the complex work with the Commission and the Council, voting weights count not as much as good arguments and good networks.
